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The perceived threat of extremist online propaganda has generated a need for countermeasures applicable to large audiences.
The dissemination of videos designed to counter violent extremism (CVE videos) is widely discussed. These videos are often
described as “counter-narratives,” implying that narrativity is a crucial factor for their effectiveness. Experimental research test-
ing this assumption is rare and direct comparisons of narrativity effects between propaganda and CVE videos are lacking. To
fill this gap, we conducted two experiments (one in a laboratory and one online) in which we confronted German participants
with different religious affiliations and from various cultural backgrounds (NStudy 1 = 338 and NStudy 2 = 155) with Islamist
extremist or right-wing extremist propaganda videos and with corresponding CVE videos. The results confirmed that narrativity
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both extremist propaganda and video-based CVE approaches.
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“Studying extremism without  studying stories is like studying
the brain without studying the neurons” (Ebner 2017, 21)
Extremist propaganda videos have become a frequent phe-
nomenon in online media. More than half of German adoles-
cents report previous experience with extremist content, 17
percent of them via YouTube (Reinemann et al. 2019). Rec-
ommendation algorithms can increase the risk of exposure:
Consumers  of  civic  education  campaigns, need  only  two
clicks to reach Islamic extremist (ISEX) or right-wing extrem-
ist (RWEX) content when following the platform’s recommen-
dations (Schmitt et al. 2018). 
One highly promoted strategy against the potentially nox-
ious effects of propaganda is the dissemination of so-called
alternative  or  counter-narratives  (for  example, Doosje  and
van Eerten 2017)—stories that reach their audience via the
same online channels, discredit the extremists’ interpretation
via a credible story-line, counter their legitimization of vio-
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lence, while, at the same time, making a compelling case for
civic participation (Aly 2014). Five out of eight projects by
the European Commission in the “Support dialogue and ex-
change of best practice in fostering tolerance and mutual re-
spect  (REG-AG)”  program  promise  to  collect  or  create
counter-narratives (The European Commission, 2018). You-
Tube itself uses “ad word targeting tools and curated YouTube
videos […]  to  confront  online  radicalization” (https://redi-
rectmethod.org/ 11.11.2018). Although there is initial evi-
dence that users do welcome videos countering deviant be-
havior obtained in contexts of health communication (Oksa-
nen  et  al. 2015)  and violent  extremism (Silverman et  al.
2016), evidence for persuasive effects of counter-narratives
regarding  radicalization-related  attitudes  and  behaviors  is
surprisingly  scarce.  Particularly,  the  implicitly  proclaimed
causal  role  of  narrativity  in  the  “battle  of  the  hearts  and
minds” (Payne 2009,1) between propaganda and CVE, has
not been tested experimentally so far. The two experiments
presented in this paper aimed to fill this gap. 
1. Literature Review
1.1 Narratives and Narrativity
The call for counter-narratives is based on the assumption
that extremist propaganda persuades via stories,  or  narra-
tives (for example Braddock 2015; Corman 2011; Leuprecht
et  al.  2009).  Narratives  have  been  studied  extensively
across a range of humanities and social sciences (for exam-
ple in criminology (Presser 2009; Sandberg et al. 2014), so-
ciology (Loseke 2007), psychology (Mar et al. 2011), and
communication  (Slater  and  Rouner  2002;  Moyer-Gusé
2008; Green and Brock 2002)). Research from communica-
tion  science  is  thereby  particularly  informative  for  under-
standing propaganda effects. 
Narratives use different  story  types  (Hinyard and Kreuter
2007), for example stories about personal experiences (per-
sonal narratives), official accounts of events by organizations
(organizational narratives), or culturally rooted tales (cultural
narratives). As  Glazzard  (2017)  argue, all  these storylines
can be artfully interwoven in extremist propaganda. 
Given that  not  all  stories are “good stories” (Kinnebrock
and Bilandzic 2006, 5), understanding the persuasiveness of
propaganda and CVE videos, requires considering their level
of narrativity. Narrativity is scalable and different stories can
score higher or lower (Fludernik 1996; Prince 2004). Narra-
tivity is a story attribute, the “presence and interaction of a
set of  […] elements” (such as dramatic, emotional depic-
tions or insights into character development) “that constitute
the  potential  […]  to  create  a  rich  mental  representation”
(Kinnebrock and Bilandzic 2006; Kalch and Bilandzic 2017).
Narrativity is also a subjective perception (de Fina and Ge-
ogakopolou 2012)—not all recipients perceive all stories un-
der all conditions in the same manner (Schreiner 2016).
1.2. Narrativity and Persuasion
The processing of narratives is a very fundamental  human
ability. As “Homo Narrans” (Fisher 1985, 74), humans are
natural-born story-tellers who use narratives to lend meaning
to  their  lives  and  the  world  around  them  (Bruner  1991,
1987) and to construct their personal,  collective, and cul-
tural identities (Loseke 2007). Meta-analyses show that nar-
ratives are also a valuable tool for persuasion (Braddock and
Dillard 2016; van Laer et al. 2013). 
Different  models  have  been  developed  to  describe  how
narratives  persuade,  with  the  Extended  Elaboration-likeli-
hood Model (E-ELM) by Slater and Rouner (2002), the Over-
coming  ResistanceModel  by  Moyer-Gusé  (2008), and  the
Transportation-Imaginary Model by Green and Brock (2002)
being the most  established in communication science. Al-
though these models set different foci, they agree that narra-
tive  persuasion is  a process characterized  by specific  an-
tecedents that motivate narrative engagement, which in turn
leads to the persuasion outcome.
1.2.1. Antecedents 
On the recipients’ side, interest in the type of story (for ex-
ample,  heroic  versus  romantic,  see  Slater  and  Rouner
2002), familiarity  with the topic (Green and Brock 2000),
and need for affect (Appel and Richter 2010) increase nar-
rative persuasion, whereas contradictory attitudes (such as
prejudice when watching videos against discrimination) im-
pair narrative persuasion (Igartua and Frutos 2017). 
Concerning the medium, production quality intensifies nar-
rative processing. Stories written by famous authors generate
higher levels of narrative processing than material produced
by non- experts (Green and Brock 2000). Good stories have
been described as those scoring higher on narrativity (Kin-
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nebrock and Bilandzic 2006). Most plausible, narrativity also
increases the appeal of propaganda and CVE videos. Judging
a video as appealing can in turn be expected to increase its
persuasiveness. Although the role of appeal has not  been
tested directly in narrative persuasion research, research on
medium credibility  provides ample evidence that more ap-
pealing (online)  content  is  more persuasive (Flanagin  and
Metzger 2007; Metzger et al. 2003).
1.2.2. Processing
The processing of narratives is usually described along two
related  but  distinct  dimensions  (for  example,  Slater  and
Rouner 2002): (1) transportation (see also Green and Brock
2000), as the construction of and immersion in a mental
model of the narrative world, and (2) identification with the
characters  (see  also  Cohen,  Tal-Or,  and  Mazor-Tregerman
2015; Tal-Or and Cohen 2010). Relevant for  the study of
propaganda and CVE videos, transportation was found to be
more relevant for textual than visual stimuli (Lien and Chen
2013) and identification (but not transportation) was found
to  reduce  counterarguing  against  a  persuasive  attempt
(Moyer-Gusé and Nabi 2010). 
Recently, a third dimension has been proposed to mediate
narrative  persuasion:  (3)  retrospective  reflection  (Hamby,
Brinberg, and Daniloski 2017) or the “recall of self- or other-
relevant memories” (12). Igartua, Cheng, and Lope (2003)
refer to a similar aspect as cognitive inducement. Supporting
the idea that cognitive engagement mediates narrative per-
suasion, Das, Nobbe, and Oliver (2017) found that prevent-
ing  such  engagement  decreased  persuasion.  However,  in
contrast  to  identification  and  transportation, cognitive  en-
gagement does not seem to steer narrative persuasion for all
recipients; Hoeken and Fikkers (2014) found that a substan-
tial share of recipients do not think about narratives at all.
1.2.3. Outcomes 
The general persuasiveness of narratives is well established
by meta-analyses (Braddock and Dillard 2016; van Laer et
al. 2013). Narrative persuasion has mainly been tested for
socially  desirable  outcomes such as health  behavior,  and
has been found to increase, amongst others, the willingness
for physical exercise (Das, Nobbe, and Oliver 2017), and de-
crease  favorable  attitudes  towards  drinking  and  driving
(Moyer-Gusé, Jain, and Chung 2012). More directly related
to CVE videos, narratives have also been found to reduce
stereotypes (Vezzali et al. 2015), foster empathy with deval-
uated groups (Oliver et al. 2012) and increase intentions to
engage more deeply with CVE videos and share them online
(Frischlich et al. 2017). So far, narrative persuasion has not
been  examined  in  the  context  of  extremist  propaganda
videos, although there is mounting evidence suggesting that
extremists  heavily  rely  on  narratives  in  their  propaganda
campaigns.
1.3. Narrative Persuasion and Extremist Propaganda 
1.3.1. Narratives versus Narrativity in Propaganda and 
CVE videos
Relying on content analytical data, different authors have ar-
gued that the persuasive power of narratives extends to ex-
tremist propaganda and has the potential to foster radical-
ization (Corman 2011; Ebner 2017; Braddock 2015; Brad-
dock and Horgan 2015; Dean, Bell,  and Vakhitova 2016;
Mahood  and  Rane  2017;  Musial  2016).  For  instance,
Halverson, Corman, and Goodall (2011) reported that sev-
eral hundred documents of ISEX groups refer to the narrative
of the “crusaders” who “occupy” Muslim territory and must
be repelled (110 ff.). RWEX groups refer to the same context
demanding the Reconquista, the regaining of “their” territo-
ries  from  the  “Muslim  invaders”  (Bayrisches  Staatsminis-
terium des Inneren, für Bau und Verkehr 2016).  
The use of narratives does not necessarily imply narrativity.
A content analysis of 112 RWEX and ISEX videos in German
showed that most of them used a non-narrative style (Rieger,
Frischlich, and Bente 2013). Narrative propaganda tends to
be received more positively. In a series of focus groups with
British  Muslims, Baines et  al. (2010)  found that  the only
video having a “strong political impact” was a dramatic car-
toon relying on an “overt entertainment format [with] a nar-
rative  momentum”  (490).  Similarly,  Rieger  et  al.  (2013)
found recipients gave more favorable ratings to propaganda
videos using a dramatic movie-clip style.
The same is true for CVE videos. A content analysis of 130
German CVE videos tackling RWEX and ISEX showed that al-
though three-quarters of the videos entailed prototypical sto-
ries, most used a non-narrative documentary style (Rieger,
Morten, and Frischlich 2017) but—as the same authors re-
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ported—CVE videos scoring higher  on narrativity  were also
rated more favorably (Frischlich et al. 2017). However, these
results do not allow conclusions on the potential role of nar-
rativities for radicalization.
1.3.2. Extremist Propaganda, CVE Videos and 
Radicalization
Radicalization is a highly contested term and definitions vary
between research fields.  In the current paper,  we use the
definition by Doosje et al. (2016), who describe radicaliza-
tion as “a process through which people become increas-
ingly  motivated  to  use  violent  means  against  out-group
members or symbolic targets to achieve behavioral change
and  political  goals”  (79).  The  model  distinguishes  three
stages: (1)  Sensitivity, in which individual  vulnerabilities or
push factors (for an overview of push factors, see Neo, Dil-
lon, and Khader 2017);  affect the response towards the pull
of the extremists (2) Group membership, where individuals
start to feel, think, and act as part of the (virtual or real-life)
extremist group; and (3) Action, where finally violence is exe-
cuted.  Although  there  is  scientific  consensus  that  propa-
ganda alone is not the cause of radicalization (for example,
Meleagrou-Hitchens and Kaderbhai 2017), it is generally as-
sumed that propaganda has the potential to fuel radicaliza-
tion processes (for example, Zick and Böckler 2015) in indi-
viduals, social groups and entire societies (Frischlich 2018). 
In the current paper, we are particularly interested in ef-
fects of propaganda and CVE videos on early attraction to
extremist groups. Causal evidence for such effects is surpris-
ingly rare (Conway 2017; Matthes 2012). Claims are often
based  on  retrospective,  biographical  analyses  (Koehler
2014) or anecdotal evidence (von Behr et al. 2013). The few
experimental studies on the effects of extremist propaganda
videos (Frischlich et al. 2015; Rieger, Frischlich, and Bente
2017), show that propaganda videos are mainly rated nega-
tively, although level of rejection varies as a function of the
videos’ style and the recipients’ individual characteristics (for
example  their  level  of  authoritarianism  or  education, see
Rieger et al. 2013). For instance, Cottee et al. (2018) found
that an ISEX video telling a person-centered story about ide-
alized life in the self-declared “Islamic state” (IS), was “re-
ceived positively among a not insignificant number of those
who profess no sympathy for the group” (20). 
Yet evidence for effects of propaganda on radicalization, for
example in terms of increased acceptance of violence, re-
mains  mixed. On  the  one  hand, Shortland  et  al.  (2017)
found that individuals who watched an ISEX video reported
lower aggression levels afterwards than control participants,
indicating a distancing from radical means after propaganda
reception. On  the  other  hand, Rieger  et  al. (2013)  found
higher  levels  of  terrorism  acceptance  after  watching  such
content. Notably, none of the studies considered narrativity. 
2. Theoretical Expectations 
Antecedents. Based on the literature, we developed a theo-
retical model adapted to the context of propaganda and CVE
videos, which we will detail in the following. Narrativity served
as  the  central  antecedent  for  both  propaganda  and  CVE
videos. 
Mediator variables. As narrativity has been suggested to be
a characteristic  of  good stories  (Kinnebrock and Bilandzic
2006), we expected that:
H1. Narrativity is positively associated with appeal.
Narrativity has been demonstrated to increase identifica-
tion (Cohen, Tal-Or, and Mazor-Tregerman 2015; Tal-Or and
Cohen 2010). We thus predicted that:
H2. Narrativity is positively associated with identification. 
More recently, cognitive engagement with the narrative has
gained increased attention in narrative persuasion research
(Hamby, Brinberg, and  Daniloski  2017;  Das, Nobbe, and
Oliver 2017). However, not all  recipients respond to narra-
tives with cognitions (Hoeken and Fikkers 2014). As such, we
asked:
RQ1.  Is  narrativity  positively  related  to  cognitive  induce-
ment?
Participants’  identification  with  the  protagonists  in  the
videos is plausibly associated with their level of cognitive in-
ducement. Identification with media characters is conceptu-
alized as “an imaginative process” (Cohen 2001, 250), that
“consists of increasing loss of self-awareness and its tempo-
rary replacement with heightened […] cognitive connections”
(251). As such, we expected that:
H3. Identification is positively associated with cognitive in-
ducement. 
Outcomes. Based on the  literature  on  radicalization, we
identified three main outcomes of interest: (1) willingness to
IJCV: Vol. 12/2018
Frischlich, Rieger, Morten, Bente: 
The Power of a Good Story: Narrative Persuasion in Extremist Propaganda and Videos against Violent Extremism
5
amplify the message of the videos as an indicator of active
online engagement; (2) attraction towards the extremist re-
spective counter-activist group as an indicator of a group ap-
proach; (3) change in agreement with extremist claims. 
Drawing from narrative  persuasion research we specified
identification  and  cognitive  engagement  as  mediator  vari-
ables of  narrative processing. In addition, we specified per-
ceived appeal as additional mediator on the basis of credi-
bility research. Overall, we expected narrative processing to
be related to our outcome variables of interest, namely that
narrative processing increases:
H4. amplifying intentions,
H5.  attraction  towards  the  group  behind  the  respective
videos (extremists versus counter-activists),
H6. story-consistent attitudes.
Further, we expected that:
H7. persuasive processing mediates the effect of narrativity
on the outcome variables.
The initial narrative persuasion model by Slater and Rouner
(2002) suggests that reinforcing the message, for instance
via subsequent discussions, additionally intensifies persua-
sive outcomes.  We speculated that amplification intentions
(that is, the intention to post the video or watch similar con-
tent) could have similar effects and suggested that: 
H8. Amplifying intentions are positively associated with at-
traction towards the group and story-consistent attitudes.
Control variables. Finally, it has been shown that the per-
suasive processing of narratives is affected by participants’ a
priori attitudes (Igartua and Frutos 2017). As such, we con-
trolled  our  analyses  for  pre-existing  agreement  with  RWEX
and  ISEX  attitudes.  Figure  1 summarizes  our  theoretical
model. 
3. The Present Research 
We tested our hypotheses in two experiments. Study 1 was a
laboratory assessment, Study 2 replicated our findings in an
online sample. Both studies were conducted in Germany. 
3.1. Study 1: Methods
3.1.1. Procedure and Measurements
The ethical  review board of the researcher’s university ap-
proved the study. To account for the influences of educa-
tional  level  on  propaganda  evaluation  (Rieger,  Frischlich,
and Bente 2019),  we recruited students and apprentices.
Participants were recruited in cities in western Germany for a
30- to 45-minute study about “judging political videos”. Re-
cruitment at universities was via student mailing-lists and fly-
ers on campus, at vocational schools via teachers. All partic-
ipants  completed the study  in  separate  cubicles  to  avoid
emotional  contagion.  Participation  was  incentivized  with
€15.
The whole study was computer-driven. After giving informed
consent, participants completed some personality and de-
mographic measures. The current analysis focusses on the
variables relevant for narrative processing as described be-
low. An overview of all measurements, including those not in
focal  attention  in  this  paper,  is
provided  in  the  supplementary
material 1 via the Open Science
Framework (OSF, available online
via  https://osf.io/eqmgs/).  Em-
bedded  in  these  questionnaires,
participants stated in how far they
agreed  with ten  extremist  state-
ments. The statements  were dis-
tilled from the propaganda videos
and selected to represent similar
story-lines in right-wing extremist
(RWEX)  and  Islamic-extremist
(ISEX)  ideologies  (for  example,
“the caliphate [the national resis-
Figure 1: Hypothesized model
Control variables indicated in grey, dashed lines indicate fully mediated paths. RWEX =
right-wing extremism, ISEX = Islamic extremism. 
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tance]  shows  the  Muslims  [the  Germans]  the  solution  to
their problems”). All items were answered on a seven-point
scale  (-3  =  “very  strong  disagreement”, 3  =  “very  strong
agreement”). Although reliability for both factors was initially
below the desired threshold (RWEX α = .65, ISEX α = .59),
reliability  increased after  the video reception (see below).
Thus, we aggregated the items to form indicators of RWEX re-
spectively ISEX baseline attitudes. 
After  the initial  questionnaires, participants  watched two
video blocks. One entailed two CVE videos, the other block
two propaganda videos.1 As shared collective identities have
been found to attenuate the response to propaganda (Rieger
et al., 2019), Muslim participants saw ISEX propaganda and
accordant CVE videos, whereas non-Muslims saw RWEX pro-
paganda  and  CVE  videos. The  order  of  videos  within  the
blocks was randomized. We selected the videos based on
prior studies (Rieger, Frischlich, and Bente 2013; Frischlich
et al. 2017). The selection aimed for (a) similar genres for
the RWEX and the ISEX videos and (b) similar narrativity in
the propaganda and CVE videos within one ideology. Based
on these criteria, we selected a video in which one or more
young extremists talk directly to the camera (so-called “talk-
ing  head  lifestyle  activist  format”)  and  a  dramatic, Holly-
wood-like  “movie  clip” from the database by Rieger  et  al.
2013 as propaganda videos. For the CVE videos, we selected
an ex-extremist talking directly into the camera and an infor-
mative documentary from the database by Rieger, Morten et
al. (2017). We describe the videos in detail in the supple-
mentary material 2 uploaded to the OSF (Table A3, accessi-
ble online via https://osf.io/eqmgs/). An independent coder
coded  the  narrative  elements  (for  example  whether  the
videos had an emotional style or described personal chal-
lenges), confirming that the propaganda and the CVE videos
within one ideology entailed similar numbers of narrative ele-
ments.
Participants rated each video on a set of dependent vari-
ables immediately after watching.2 Subjective narrativity, our
main antecedent of narrative persuasion, was measured via
1 The order of videos and blocks was randomized. The order of blocks was
uncorrelated with most of the dependent variables, wherefore we did not in-
spect this variable further. There was only one small association (r = .14, p
< .05) between the order of the blocks and identification reported after the
CVE videos, showing that participants identified more with the CVE videos
when they had seen the propaganda first, all other r < .13, all p > .05. 
participants’ agreement with the statement: “the video told a
story” (Lien and Chen 2013; Frischlich et al. 2017) on a
five-point scale (0 = “not at all”, 4 = “totally”). 
Narrative processing was measured with nine items (see
supplementary material, 2, accessible online via https://os-
f.io/eqmgs/)  addressing  appeal (for  example:  “the  video
was professional”), identification (for example: “I could iden-
tify with at least one person in the video”), and cognitive in-
ducement (for example: “the video made me think”), on the
basis of prior research (Frischlich et al. 2017). A multi-group
confirmatory factor analysis (MG-CFA) confirmed that the ba-
sic model structure was identical across video blocks (con-
figural invariance), and that the items had largely the same
loading onto their factors irrespective of video block (partial
metric invariance). One item (“I could picture myself in that
situation”)  loaded higher  on identification after  the propa-
ganda than after the CVE videos. The final model showed an
acceptable fit to the data (see Table 2). All factor loadings
were significant (all p < .001) and substantial (all >.60), and
the  Fornell-Laker  criterion  confirmed  discriminant  validity
(see supplementary material 2, Table B in the OSF, for de-
tails). 
As first  outcome variable, we measured intentions to  am-
plify the video’s message with two items (“I would post the
video”, “I  would  watch more videos like  this”)  taken from
Frischlich et al. (2017). The other two outcome variables (at-
traction to the group and changes in agreement with extrem-
ist statements) were measured after each block. Participants
read the following statement: 
“People belong to all kinds of groups, such as sports teams,
political parties, religious communities, or interest  groups. The
videos you have watched show the attitudes of a specific group
of people. Please report how much you agree with the following
statements about this group.”
2 The current study focusses on the hypothesized variables of narrative per-
suasion. 
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Figure 2: Narrative persuasion in the propaganda videos (Study 1) 
**p ≤ .01, *p < .05.
Missing values imputed via estimation maximization algorithm. Depicted are the standardized coefficients and 90 percent confidence inter-
vals [in square brackets] based on 1000 bootstrap samples. For clarity, co-variances and non-statistically significant paths are not pre-
sented. Control variable paths are indicated in grey. 
Figure 3: Narrative Persuasion in CVE Videos (Study 1)
**p ≤ .01, *p < .05. Depicted are the standardized coefficients and 90% confidence intervals [in square brackets] based on 1000 boot -
strap samples. For clarity, co-variances and non-significant paths are not presented. Control variable paths are marked in grey.
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Afterwards, they  stated their  agreement  with eight  items
(such as “I can imagine myself supporting the group”), using
a seven-point scale (0 = “fully disagree”, 6 = “fully agree”).
The scale showed satisfying reliability  (αCVE = .90, αPropa-
ganda = .87). Finally, agreement with the extremist statements
was measured for the second respectively third time (Post
propaganda RWEX α = .73, ISEX α = .71; post CVE videos:
RWEX α = .70, ISEX α = .69). In the last step, participants
answered some additional questions not examined here, be-
fore they were fully debriefed, received information about exit
options from violent extremism, and were given their incen-
tive. 
3.1.2. Sample
A total of 338 individuals (162 women) participated. They
were, on average, 23 years old (SD = 4.31, range 16–55
years).  Two-thirds (67 percent) were students,  30 percent
were apprentices (3 percent were employed). Most self-iden-
tified as Christians (50 percent), Muslims (28 percent), or
atheists (19 percent);  3 percent reported another religion.
About half had a first- or second-generation migration back-
ground (52 percent). 
3.2. Study 1: Results
3.2.1. Missing Values 
A pattern analysis via SPSS showed that only a small num-
ber of data points were missing (5.11 percent, slightly above
the ignorable threshold (Kline 1998)). Littles’ Missing Com-
pletely  at  Random  (MCAR)  Test  reached  significance,
²(27)χ  = 3476.73,  p < .001, indicating the need for impu-
tation (Kline 1998; Byrne 2010). As there is no statistical
technique to handle non-random missing values (NMARs) to
a satisfactory  extent,  different  treatments  should  be com-
pared (Kline 1998). We compared three: (1)  listwise exclu-
sion; (2) estimated maximum (EM) imputation, where miss-
ing values are replaced via an adaptive algorithm before the
analysis, allowing for the inspection of modification indices
and bootstrapped confidence intervals (Musil et al. 2002):
and (3) Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimation. ML is consid-
ered least biased in case of NMARs but does not allow for
bootstrapping (Kline 1998; Byrne 2010). Overall, the differ-
ent treatments did not change the pattern, wherefore we re-
port only the results for the EM-imputed data (see supple-
mentary material 2 Table C for all results across imputation
strategies, accessible online via https://osf.io/eqmgs/).
3.2.2. Preliminary Analyses 
Descriptive analyses. 
An inspection of the zero-order correlations (Table 1) showed
that  agreement  with  extremist  statements  correlated  very
strongly across time points (all r > .79), suggesting a lack of
variability on this outcome. To explore this further, we ran an
initial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) using the
three time points as within-subjects factor  and agreement
with RWEX and ISEX statements as dependent variables. Al-
though the effect of time reached significance using Pillai’s
trace,  V = 0.74, F (1,336) = 487.80,  p < .001, the univari-
ate  analysis  showed  that  this  effect  was  driven  by  lower
agreement with the RWEX statements after both the propa-
ganda  videos  (M  = 1.45,  SE = .07)  and  the  CVE  videos
(M = 1.50,  SE = .06) compared to the baseline agreement
(M = 1.70, SE = .06). Thus, H6 had to be rejected, and ex-
tremist attitudes were excluded from the subsequent analy-
ses. 
3.2.3. Tests of Hypotheses
We tested our theoretical model (Figure 1) via a path analy-
sis  using  narrativity  as  antecedent,  appeal,  identification,
and cognitive inducement  as mediators,  and amplification
intentions and attraction as outcome variables.  RWEX and
ISEX served as control variables. We used manifest variables
for our constructs as the sample size was too small to esti-
mate a model with latent variables. The initial checks identi-
fied four paths that varied between video blocks. Unsurpris-
ingly,  RWEX and ISEX  attitudes were associated  positively
with the appeal of, and the identification with extremist pro-
paganda as well as the attraction to extremist groups, but
negatively  with  the  response  to  counter-activists  and  CVE
videos. In addition, the path between cognitive inducement
and amplification intentions varied between blocks. As we
considered this to be theoretically meaningful,  we allowed
these factor weights to vary between video blocks in the final
model. The final model showed an acceptable fit to the data
(see Table 2). 
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An inspection of the paths largely confirmed our expecta-
tions: Narrativity was associated with a higher appeal of (H1)
and higher levels of identification with (H2) both propaganda
and CVE videos (see Figure 2 and 3). Narrativity also pre-
dicted higher levels of cognitive inducement (RQ 1), as did
identification  (H3). All  three  paths of  narrative  processing
were associated with stronger amplification intentions (H4)
and  had  positive  indirect  effects  on  amplifying  intentions
(H7) for  both the propaganda videos and the CVE videos
(standardized abCVE = .29, CI [.24, .34], abPropaganda = .27,
CI [.23, .33]). Attenuating our expectations formulated in H5,
only  identification was significantly  associated  with attrac-
tion. Narrativity also had a significant indirect effect on at-
traction towards the extremists (standardized  ab  = .21, CI
[.16, .26]) and the counter-activists (standardized ab = .15,
CI  [.12, .19]). In  addition, intentions to  amplify  the mes-
sages  of  the  respective  videos  were  positively  associated
with attraction, too (H8).3 
3.4. Discussion
Overall, Study 1 confirmed narrativity as a crucial antecedent
for  the  narrative  processing  of  both  extremist  propaganda
3 When age and political  attitude were controlled for, the paths between
narrativity and cognitive inducement failed to reach significance for the pro-
paganda videos and amplification intentions for the CVE videos no longer
predicted attraction to the counter-activists. Otherwise the main process for
narrative persuasion did not change.
and CVE videos. In addition, the study lent initial support to
the assumption that narrativity could foster attraction to ex-
tremists versus counter-activist and motivate online engage-
ment for either the one or the other side. Although we did
not aim at comparing the average level of these processes,
the data showed that recipients rated the CVE videos consis-
tently  more positively  than the propaganda videos.  As  we
cannot exclude the possibility that this difference is at least
partially  driven by  the higher  social  desirability  (King  and
Bruner 2000) of rating CVE videos favorably, we decided to
rerun the study in a more anonymous online environment.
4. Study 2
Overall,  Study 2 employed the same procedure and mea-
surements as Study 1 with the exception that it was struc-
tured as  an anonymous online  survey  and,  in  contrast  to
Study 1, the output used 1 (not zero) as lowest value. Invita-
tion was sent via email over university mailing lists across
Germany, shared by Muslim communities in the researchers’
home town, and advertised at local vocational schools. 
4.1. Sample
A total of 157 individuals (69 women) participated; average
age was 28 years (SD = 9.63, range 18–62 years). Two-
thirds (65 percent) were students at the time of data collec-
tion, and 31 percent were apprentices. The rest were already
in the workforce (4 percent). Most identified as Muslims (47
Table 2: Model fit indices for Study 1 and 2
Absolute fit-indices   Incremental fit-in-
dices
²χ df p ²/dfχ RMSEA pclose TLI CFI
Threshold for acceptable fit ≤ 3 ≤.10   ≥0.95 ≥0.95
Threshold for good fit ≥.05 ≤ 2 ≤.05   ≥0.97 ≥0.97
S1
MG-CFA 
Unconstrained only CVE 32.65 22 .07 1 0.04 .76 0.99 0.99
Unconstrained only propaganda 93.85 22 .00 4 0.1 .00 0.94 0.96
Unconstrained baseline  126.5 44 < .001 3 0.05 .32 0.96 0.97
Final Model (MG-CFA) 135.5 49 < .001 3 0.05 .41 0.96 0.97
Pathmodel
Unconstrained baseline  0 0 - - 0.01 .96 - 1.
Final Pathmodel 14.27 16 .58 1 0 1.00 1 1
S2 Pathmodel 
Unconstrained baseline 0 0 - - 1
Final Pathmodel 41.44 16 < .001 - 0.07 0.09 0.93 0.98
Notes: MGFA = Multi-group factor analysis with video block as grouping variables. CVE = Counter–violent extremism videos. S1 = Study
1, S2 = Study 2. Missing values were imputed via estimated maximization before analysis.
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percent), Christians (19 percent), or atheists (17 percent).
Sixteen percent reported another religion (6 percent of them
were Jewish,  4 percent Buddhist,  4 percent  Hindu, and 3
percent other). About two-thirds had a migration background
(70 percent).
4.2. Results
4.2.1 Missing Values
A pattern analysis via SPSS showed that only a small num-
ber  of  our  data points  were missing  (one percent),  all  of
them completely  at  random (Littles’  MCAR test,  ²(34) =χ
27.09 p = .79) suggesting that missing values could be ig-
Figure 4: Narrative persuasion in propaganda videos (Study 2)
**p ≤ .01,*p < .05. Depicted are the standardized coefficients and 90% confidence intervals [in square brackets] based on 1000 bootstrap
samples. For clarity, co-variances and non-significant paths are not presented. Control variable paths are marked in grey. 
Figure 5: Narrative Persuasion in CVE Videos (Study 2)
**p≤ .01,*p <.05. Depicted are the standardized coefficients and 90% confidence intervals based on 1000 bootstrap samples. For clarity,
co-variances and non-statistically significant paths are not presented. The control variables marked in grey.
IJCV: Vol. 12/2018
Frischlich, Rieger, Morten, Bente: 
The Power of a Good Story: Narrative Persuasion in Extremist Propaganda and Videos against Violent Extremism
12
nored (Kline 1998)). As such, we focused on a dataset were
missing values were imputed via the estimated maximization
algorithm (see Table 1 for the descriptives). Notably, in con-
trast to the laboratory assessment, the online survey allowed
participants to simply close their  browser and thus not be
counted by the survey software. As such, the true number of
missing values might be larger, but data set does not allow
for examination of these cases. 
4.2.2 Model Test
As we were primarily interested in the path model’s fit to the
new dataset, we used the same model as in Study 1. Al-
though the partially constrained model fitted less well to the
data than the fully unconstrained one, ²(16) = 41.44, pχ
< .001, the final model from Study 1 still showed an accept-
able fit to the data (see Table 2) so we retained it. Replicat-
ing our results, narrativity was positively associated with all
three  dimensions  of  narrative  processing  (H1,  H2,  RQ1),
identification increased cognitive inducement (H4), and nar-
rative processing was positively related to amplification in-
tentions (H4). As in Study 1, only identification was also re-
lated to attraction towards the extremist group (H5). Figure 3
and 4 display the corresponding paths. An inspection of the
indirect effects of narrativity confirmed the indirect effects on
amplification intentions (H7) (standardized abCVE = .38, CI
[.29, .47],  abPropaganda = .27, CI [.19, .35]) as well as at-
traction  (H8)  (standardized  abCVE  =  .18,  CI  [.12,  .26],
abPropaganda = .20, CI [.13, .29]). 
5. General Discussion
It has been suggested that extremist propaganda persuades
by narratives, wherefore so-called counter- or alternative nar-
ratives  are  needed  (Braddock  2015;  Corman  2011;  Le-
uprecht et al. 2009). Although there is growing evidence for
extremists’  usage of  narratives  in  their  propaganda (Brad-
dock and Horgan 2015; Corman 2011; Ebner 2017), experi-
mental evidence for causal effects of narratives in the con-
text of extremist propaganda and CVE videos is scarce. The
current two studies filled this gap. Drawing on established
models  of  narrative  persuasion  (Slater  and Rouner  2002;
Green  and  Brock  2002;  Moyer-Gusé,  Jain,  and  Chung
2012), and recent studies highlighting the role of narrativi-
ties  in  narrative  persuasion  (Kinnebrock  and  Bilandzic
2006), the current paper developed a theoretical model for
narrative  persuasion  in  propaganda  and  CVE  videos  and
confirmed this model in two studies. 
5.1. Summary and Evaluation of Hypotheses 
In both studies, when controlling for pre-existing agreement
with RWEX and ISEX statements, narrativity predicted an in-
creased appeal of (H1) and identification (H2), and cogni-
tive engagement with (RQ1) both extremist propaganda and
CVE videos. Further, identification and cognitive inducement
were positively related (H3). Thus, our data provides first evi-
dence that narrativity — in both propaganda and CVE videos
— does indeed motivate narrative processing of such videos.
In line with narrative persuasion research, this narrative pro-
cessing  was  positively  related  to  amplification  intentions
(H4). Furthermore, identification was also related to attrac-
tion towards extremists (H5). As such, our results echo sci-
entific reviews stating that online media might fuel but not
trigger  radicalization  processes  (Meleagrou-Hitchens  and
Kaderbhai 2017; Gill et al. 2015). At the same time, they
underline the need for democratic, pluralistic voices in online
media that offer non-extremist identification figures. 
Mediated via appeal, identification, and cognitive induce-
ment, narrativity consistently had a strong indirect effect on
amplification intentions. Mediated via identification, narrativ-
ity  also  had  a  medium-sized  indirect  effect  on  attraction
(H7), with amplification intentions and attraction being posi-
tively  associated  (H8). Overall,  our  findings  underline  the
need to consider narrativity (and not only narratives) in the
context of propaganda and CVE videos. 
In  contrast  to  our  expectations, propaganda  did  not  in-
crease agreement with extremist statements (H6). Instead,
watching  propaganda  decreased  agreement  with  RWEX
statements (and did not affect ISEX statements), indicating a
contrast effect. A prior study by Appel (2011) already found
that stories about a stupid, xenophobic hooligan can evoke
such contrast effects where people are motivated to distance
from  the  protagonist. Exploring  these  conditions  in  detail
seems to be a fruitful direction for future research. Overall,
our  results  add  to  the  scarce  literature  on  propaganda’s
causal  effects  on radicalization  processes (Conway  2017)
and contradict dystopic visions about immediate radicalizing
effects. At the same time, they speak against ignoring propa-
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ganda effects, as narrativity can foster attraction towards ex-
tremists. 
Notably, although CVE videos did not affect agreement with
ISEX  statements, they did decrease agreement  with  RWEX
statements (although the effect was smaller than for the pro-
paganda videos). Complementing our findings with a qualita-
tive approach exploring participants’ thoughts about extrem-
ist statements following CVE video consumption seems to be
necessary to understand these differences better. 
5.2. Limitations and Future Research Directions
The two studies in this paper had several limitations. First,
we focused on (young) adults in Germany. Although we had
a wide age range, most participants were either students or
apprentices. We also focused on extremism-distant individu-
als with moderate religious and political attitudes. Future re-
search in samples with different attitudes is needed to exam-
ine the generalizability of the results. 
Second, the present studies tested the relevance of narra-
tivities as a video feature. The effects might  vary  between
video and other media (Braddock and Dillard 2016), making
the examination of different media types desirable.
Finally, our studies focused on attitudes and intentions. Al-
though there is meta-analytical evidence that behavioral in-
tentions predict subsequent behaviors (Robin et al. 2011),
the results of our study are not immediately transferrable to
concrete behaviors. Extremists themselves have reported a
large  gap  between  online  and  offline  engagement  (Schils
and Verhage 2017). 
5.3. Conclusion
Nonetheless, our studies provide initial evidence for a posi-
tive  association  between  narrativity  in  propaganda  videos
and the attraction to extremist groups. Returning to the initial
quote by Ebner (2017, 35), they provide first evidence that
not only is “Studying extremism without studying stories is
like  studying  the  brain  without  studying  the neurons”  but
studying propaganda and CVE videos without studying the
power of narrativity is like dissecting the figurative brain in-
stead of examining its vibrant flow.
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